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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici Curiae are 105 economists who have studied, researched, and 
participated in the national policy discussion relating to the healthcare markets.  
Amici include Nobel laureates, former senior government officials, and faculty 
from research universities around the country. See supra pp.  C-1 to C-10.  Amici 
support the need for reform, but believe that the recent federal legislation will 
likely exacerbate, rather than constrain, the inflation in healthcare costs that poses 
a serious long-term challenge to the U.S. economy.  Amici submit this brief to 
provide the Court with a more complete and accurate understanding of the 
statistics relied upon by the Government and its amici.  Those numbers are 
essential to understanding the individual mandate’s true purpose and impact, as 
well as the shortcomings in the Government’s effort to overturn the well-reasoned 
decision below.   
                                           
1  All parties to this appeal have consented to the filing of this brief.  Fed. R. 
App. P. 29(a).  No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor 
did any party, person, or entity other than Amici and their counsel make a 
monetary contribution to the preparation and submission of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
 Amici adopt the Restatement of the Case in the brief filed by Private 
Plaintiffs-Appellees.  
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (“ACA” or the “Act”), Congress asserted the 
authority to compel individuals to participate in the market for health insurance.  
Never before has the Government undertaken such a measure.  The question is 
whether such an unprecedented law is justified as an application of Congress’s 
power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 3, or a measure “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” that power, 
id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.    
In trying to make that case, the Government, supported by the amicus brief 
of the Economic Scholars (the “Economist Amici”), offers a chain of causation that 
casts individual consumers’ decisions to remain outside the health insurance 
market as an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce by materially 
increasing the costs of health insurance for all Americans.  The Government claims 
that section 1501, the individual insurance mandate, is a necessary response to 
address the $43 billion in uncompensated care allegedly caused by the voluntary 
   3
decisions of these individuals—who are, by definition, healthy and not poor—not 
to purchase health insurance.  U.S. Br. at 2, 27-28. 
The Government and the Economist Amici also repeatedly describe the 
healthcare industry as “unique,” because of its high rates of participation, high 
costs, federal mandates, and the purported uncertainty surrounding the need for 
care.  U.S. Br. at 9-10; Econ. Br. at 8-14.  This emphasis on the “uniqueness” of 
the market is plainly designed (1) to compensate for the absence of any true 
limiting principles in their legal argument and (2) to convince the Court that 
upholding the federal authority to compel market participation here would not do 
away with the traditional limits on the sweep of Congress’s powers in other areas. 
The Government’s justifications for the individual mandate do not withstand 
scrutiny, however, because the economic premises on which they rely are 
demonstrably untrue.  The individual mandate has almost nothing to do with cost-
shifting in healthcare markets because the targeted population of the mandate plays 
a minimal role in the $43 billion of uncompensated costs identified by the 
Government.  The mandate was expressly created not to stop cost-shifting, but to 
compel millions of Americans to pay more for health insurance than they receive 
in benefits to subsidize both the voluntarily insured and the insurers, and thereby 
ameliorate the steep rise in premiums that would otherwise be caused by the ACA.   
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Likewise, the healthcare market is “unique” only in the sense that each 
snowflake is unique.  The economic features relied upon by the Government are 
not distinct to health care, but are characteristic of many markets.  Indeed, 
frequently, these externalities are not even intrinsic to healthcare markets 
themselves, but rather reflect distortions caused by federal law.  Accordingly, these 
features can serve as neither a justification for expanded federal regulation nor a 
genuine limiting principle for the assertion of federal authority reflected in the 
individual mandate.   
1.  The Government’s claim that the voluntarily uninsured, by staying out of 
the market, impose $43 billion in uncompensated costs has no basis in fact.  While 
the Government repeatedly invokes this figure, it nowhere identifies the specific 
costs actually imposed by the individuals compelled by the mandate to purchase 
health insurance.  Yet the Government actually collects such information through 
the authoritative Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (“MEPS”).  Those data show 
that this class’s healthcare costs are well below average, and the total amount of 
uncompensated costs attributable to it are no more than $8 billion annually, or one-
third of one percent of the Nation’s $2.4 trillion in annual healthcare costs.  In 
other words, the individual mandate cannot reasonably be justified on the ground 
that it remedies the costs imposed on the system by the voluntarily uninsured. 
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The Government further fails to show that “average” Americans cannot 
afford their own healthcare costs and thus, the uninsured must ipso facto contribute 
to the cost-shifting problem.  Although the Economist Amici emphasize the 
approximately $6,000 spent by the average American per year on health care, they 
provide no analysis of the costs paid by those subject to the mandate.  In fact, the 
undisputed data show that the targets of the mandate on average consume less than 
one-seventh of that figure. 
That the individual mandate has little, if anything, to do with uncompensated 
care only underscores that the real purpose of the mandate is what the Government 
here labels its “second” function—namely, maintaining “the viability of the Act’s 
provisions that bar insurers from denying coverage or setting premiums based on 
medical condition or history.”  U.S. Br. at 16. 
The ACA prevents health insurers from making the basic actuarial decisions 
that they make in every other insurance market.  Insurers may neither withhold 
health insurance from those with preexisting conditions nor price insurance 
premiums to match applicants’ known actuarial risks.  By requiring health insurers 
to cover the sick and to set premiums based on average costs, these federal 
requirements would dramatically increase healthcare premiums for all insured 
Americans, unless Congress at the same time forces the young and healthy with 
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relatively little need for comprehensive health insurance to enter the market on 
disadvantageous terms. 
Whether or not these requirements are good policy, what is clear as a 
constitutional matter is that Congress is exercising federal power not to regulate 
“the consumption of healthcare without insurance,” U.S. Br. at 2, but to compel the 
voluntarily uninsured to purchase insurance at disadvantageous prices, as a quid 
pro quo for relieving the deleterious effect of related federal requirements.  As the 
District Court recognized, if Congress may regulate noncommercial activity just to 
fix the distortions caused by federal regulations—present or future—there is no 
practical limit to its authority.  See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health 
and Human Servs., --- F.Supp.2d ---, 2011 WL 285683, at *25-27 (N.D. Fla. 
Jan. 31, 2011); cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-64, 567-68 (1995). 
2.  Recognizing the unprecedented exertion of federal authority, and the 
absence of any true limiting principle, the Government and its amici argue that the 
healthcare industry is “unique” and thus this Court need not be concerned that 
upholding the individual mandate will remove any practical limit to Congress’s 
commerce power.  The Government’s argument dramatically overstates the 
distinctive characteristics of the healthcare industry, most of which are routinely 
found in varying degrees in many other markets.   
   7
While the presence of market externalities in the healthcare industry cannot 
expand the constitutional scope of federal power, the Government’s inability to 
impose the insurance mandate need not doom effective healthcare reform, either at 
the national or the state level.  Health care is typically consumed locally, and 
health insurance markets themselves primarily operate within the States.  The 
Government’s attempt to fashion a singular, universal solution is not necessary to 
address the local externalities arising in these markets and provides no justification 
for casting aside the traditional constitutional limitations on federal power.   
ARGUMENT 
 
I. THE GOVERNMENT’S RELIANCE ON COST SHIFTING IS 
UNFOUNDED BECAUSE THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE HAS 
LITTLE IMPACT ON UNCOMPENSATED HEALTHCARE COSTS. 
 
The Government contends that section 1501’s mandate is necessary because 
people who do not purchase health insurance substantially “affect” markets for 
medical services by failing to pay for their own care and thus increase the cost of 
health care for everyone else.  U.S. Br. at 10-12.  Most strikingly, the Government 
contends that the individual mandate is necessary to address more than $43 billion 
in annualized healthcare costs that the voluntarily uninsured allegedly do not pay.  
Id. at 11, 16.  According to the Government, these individuals should be regarded 
as free-riders who take advantage of health care paid for by others and so may 
sensibly be compelled to bear the costs that they otherwise would shift onto others.   
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As the Economist Amici further explain: 
[the] collective effect of individual decisions not to purchase health 
insurance have a profound effect on the costs of health care insurance 
premiums, the coverage which insurance companies can provide at 
reasonable rates, and the extent to which the costs of providing health 
care to the uninsured are borne by others, including the taxpayer. As 
the District Court recognized, the total costs of uncompensated care 
in 2008 alone were $43 billion. 
 
Econ. Br. at 24-25.  The problem with this story is that it is untrue.  As a matter of 
basic economics, the individual mandate has virtually nothing to do with the 
alleged $43 billion of uncompensated costs cited by the Government.  Instead, the 
mandate is designed to subsidize the dramatic increase in costs that the 
requirements of the Act itself will impose on health insurers. 
A. There Is No Evidence That Individuals Who Choose To Forgo 
Insurance Are a Financial Burden on the Healthcare System. 
The Government’s argument that the voluntarily uninsured impose $43 
billion on the rest of the economy lacks any support.  The Government provides 
none and in fact, the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) has recognized that the 
ACA will “have minimal effects on . . . cost shifting.”2   
The individual mandate, by definition, targets people who choose not to 
purchase health insurance and are not otherwise covered by Medicaid or Medicare.  
                                           
2  CBO, An Analysis of Health Insurance Premiums Under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 6 (Nov. 30, 2009) (“Premiums”), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/107xx/doc10781/11-30-Premiums.pdf.   
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These people tend to be younger, healthier, and less in need of medical care.3  
These citizens make the rational economic decision to pay for their relatively 
modest healthcare expenditures out of pocket, rather than purchasing health 
insurance.  Indeed, if they needed health insurance at all, they would require only 
the relatively inexpensive insurance limited to covering catastrophic care, a market 
now foreclosed by the ACA.   
There is no good economic evidence that when such people do require 
medical care, the cost of that care is passed on to others in a manner that increases 
the costs of health insurance.  In fact, those who willfully choose to forgo 
insurance tend to overcompensate the market for their own care relative to other 
consumers of healthcare services because they generally pay their medical bills and 
are not able to obtain care at prices negotiated by insurance providers.4   
1. The Individual Mandate Will Contribute Little Toward 
Recovering the $43 Billion in Uncompensated Healthcare 
Costs Invoked by the Government. 
The individual mandate plainly cannot be justified as a solution to the 
alleged cost-shifting problem.  The Government’s $43 billion figure comes from 
analyses of healthcare costs contained in the MEPS dataset, which comprises data 
                                           
3  Kaiser Commission, Covering the Uninsured in 2008, 60 (Aug. 2008), 
available at http://kff.org/uninsured/upload/7809.pdf. 
4  Jonathan Gruber & David Rodriquez, “How Much Uncompensated Care 
Do Doctors Provide?,” 26 J. Health Econ. 1151, 1159-61 (Dec. 2007). 
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from large-scale surveys of families and individuals, their medical providers, and 
employers and is the most complete source of data on health care expenditures in 
the United States.  MEPS is collected and maintained under the auspices of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services.5 
 As a threshold matter, the Government’s reliance on the alleged $43 billion 
in uncompensated care makes a serious impression only until one realizes that the 
total value of the healthcare market in 2008 was roughly $2.4 trillion.  As the CBO 
has stated, “the total amount of cost shifting in the current health care system 
appears to be modest relative to the overall cost of health insurance.”6  Thus, even 
if accurate, the $43 billion in uncompensated care, while not insignificant, still 
represents less than 1.8 percent of the overall market.7   
 Even that 1.8 percent, however, is quite misleading because it represents the 
totality of uncompensated care in the healthcare system, not the costs associated 
with the voluntarily uninsured.  Indeed, the MEPS data reveals that the actual 
portion of uncompensated care attributable to those subject to the individual 
mandate is vastly smaller, and in fact constitutes less than one-third of one percent 
of the overall market for health care. 
                                           
5  See http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb. 
6  CBO, Premiums, 12-13; see also id. at 16. 
7  Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”), National Health 
Expenditure 2009 Highlights, at Table 1 (2011). 
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 Perhaps the easiest way to see this reality is to start from the $43 billion 
figure and to subtract from it the uncompensated costs that will not be affected by 
the individual mandate: 
 Preexisting conditions.  $8.7 billion of the $43 billion reflects care 
rendered to individuals who would purchase health insurance, but whose 
preexisting conditions prevented them from doing so; under the Act, they 
would be guaranteed coverage and so would no longer be uninsured;8    
 Medicaid Recipients.  Of the remaining $34.3 billion, roughly $15 billion 
must be deducted for cost-shifters who are now newly eligible for 
Medicaid based on the Act’s expansion of insurance to all individuals 
and households whose income is at or below 133 percent of the poverty 
line;9 
 Illegal Immigrants and Other Nonresidents.  Of the remaining $19.3 
billion, roughly $8.1 billion is attributable to uncompensated care 
provided to illegal aliens or other nonresidents of the United States, who 
will not be subject to the mandate at all;10 and 
 Payments Owed by the Insured.  Of the remaining $10.6 billion, another 
$3.3 billion is attributable to care rendered to insured individuals who 
nonetheless did not pay their out-of-pocket share, such as co-payments or 
the like.11  The ACA would have no effect on these cost-shifters. 
Thus, the maximum share of uncompensated care attributable to the 
mandate’s target class is less than $8 billion, or less than one-third of one percent 
                                           
8  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3. 
9  Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). 
10  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(3).   
11  Exhibit A explains the methodology by which these numbers were 
obtained.  These figures reflect weighted estimates based on provider recovery 
rates (i.e., the amount that providers typically recover after treatment).  Appendix 
A also includes the unweighted numbers, which in fact result in an even smaller 
amount (reflecting the greater recovery rate from those affected by the mandate).   
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of the healthcare market.12  The actual figure is almost certainly smaller.  
Accordingly, the voluntarily uninsured, who choose to pay their own relatively 
modest healthcare costs out of pocket, thus plainly cannot be described as villains 
who impose significant uncompensated costs on others.  The Government cannot 
rationally justify the individual mandate as a response to the miniscule amount of 
uncompensated care posed by the class subject to the mandate.   
2. The Government and Its Amici Overstate the  
Economic Burden that Health Care Imposes  
on the Voluntarily Uninsured. 
Apart from invoking the $43 billion figure, the Government and its amici 
contend that the voluntarily uninsured must receive uncompensated care because 
participation in the market is “essentially universal” and frequently expensive.  U.S. 
Br. at 7.  The Economist Amici offer some specifics.  They claim that the “average 
person” in 2007 used $6,186 in “personal healthcare services,” which is “over 10 
percent of the median family’s income.”  Econ. Br. at 11.  Because health care is 
universal and expensive, the Economist Amici reason, everyone who does not 
obtain insurance must be in the business of cost-shifting.  Id.  The Government too 
                                           
12  This analysis is consistent with a recent study of California’s healthcare 
system, which concluded that “[c]ost shifting from the [voluntarily] uninsured is 
minimal.” Daniel P. Kessler, “Cost Shifting in California Hospitals:  What Is the 
Effect on Private Payers?,” California Foundation for Commerce and Education 
(2007), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/files/CaseStudy/9bc04cf2-dd57-
4f1d-ab3c-e5e0d5e7c96e/Presentation/CaseStudyFile/4796ca54-3a8a-4676-a61c-
4c4b9f5a5272/Kessler_CFCE_Cost_Shift_Study%206-6-07.pdf. 
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emphasizes how this costliness renders the payment of medical bills without 
insurance so difficult that only the mandate can forestall the inevitable cost-shifting.  
See U.S. Br. at 10-12.   
But statistics designed to show that the “average” person consumes a 
substantial amount of health care tell the Court nothing about the healthcare costs 
of those targeted by the mandate.  As Mark Twain knew, statistics can be grossly 
misleading unless apples are compared with apples, and oranges with oranges.13  
Thus, the Government and its amici conflate a singular category of healthcare 
consumers—the young, healthy, and voluntarily uninsured—with the aggregate 
market, from which the narrower category differs in marked respects.   
The mandate is not targeted against the “average” American in the 
healthcare market.  It is meant to address adverse selection, and it is directed at 
younger, healthy individuals who, in the absence of such a mandate, would make 
an economically rational choice to forgo health insurance.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18091(a)(2)(I); Econ. Br. at 17-18.  As might be expected, this class consumes 
only a fraction of the national average in healthcare services per year.  In fact, in 
2010, the voluntarily uninsured consumed, on average, only $854 in healthcare 
services, approximately 14 percent of the claimed “average” healthcare 
                                           
13  Mark Twain, “Chapters from My Autobiography,” North American 
Review, available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/19987/19987-h/19987-h.htm 
(observing that “[t]here are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics”). 
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expenditure.  That figure, moreover, constitutes less than 1.1 percent of an average 
family’s yearly income based on the most recent available data, a far cry from the 
10 percent costs of the “average” American.14  Cf. Econ. Br. at 11.  Thus, with 
regard to the specific class of persons targeted by the mandate, the Government’s 
argument that their health care is too expensive to afford is simply not borne out by 
the data. 
The Economist Amici employ similarly flawed logic in arguing that because 
federal law requires emergency stabilization care, the voluntarily uninsured are an 
inherent cause of uncompensated care.  See Econ. Br. at 13.  Once again, the data 
show that the targets of the mandate consume only $56 per year on average in total 
emergency-room care, which includes both the mandated emergency stabilization 
care (which may still be billed to patients) and the more routine care administered 
there.  See Appendix A.  The data thus provides no evidence that the voluntarily 
uninsured are, as a class, receiving significant amounts of uncompensated care 
such that one could rationally justify the individual mandate as a solution to this 
purported cost-shifting problem.   
                                           
14  See Brian K. Bucks, Arthur B. Kennickell, Traci L. Mach, and Kevin B. 
Moore, “Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2004 to 2007:  Evidence from the 
Survey of Consumer Finances,” Survey of Current Business, A5 (Feb. 2009).  In 
2007, the average household earned roughly $84,000. 
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B. The Individual Mandate Was Never About Addressing the  
Costs of Uncompensated Care. 
The conclusion that the individual mandate will have little impact on 
reducing the costs of uncompensated care should not be particularly surprising to 
anyone, economist or otherwise, who has studied the healthcare markets, because 
Congress did not enact the individual mandate to target uncompensated care or 
even to address any market failures caused by the private market for health 
insurance.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 18091(a)(2)(C), 18091(a)(2)(I) (explaining that the 
mandate forces “healthy individuals” into the market as “new consumers” to 
reduce insurers’ costs).  The Government itself acknowledges that the individual 
mandate “is key to the viability of the Act’s provisions that bar insurers from 
denying coverage or setting premiums based on medical condition or history.”  U.S. 
Br. at 16.15      
In purpose and effect, the individual mandate is designed to compensate 
health insurers for the fundamental distortions caused by the heavy hand of federal 
regulations under the ACA.  In the name of expanding coverage, Congress 
prohibited insurers from making the basic pricing decisions that they otherwise 
                                           
15  That the ACA was never grounded in an attempt to curb cost-shifting is 
likewise strikingly clear in Congress’s half-hearted commitment to compel 
compliance.  The penalties set by the mandate are modest enough that many “free 
riders” would rationally choose to pay them rather than purchase insurance, see 26 
U.S.C. § 5000A, and the Act liberally excuses individuals from the mandate for 
purposes of “hardship,” see id. 
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would make as rational economic actors.  The ACA requires insurers to provide 
health coverage to those with preexisting conditions, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1(a), 
300gg-3(a).  More significantly, insurers may not price healthcare coverage based 
on the actuarial risks posed by a class of applicants, but must employ “community-
rated” premiums—i.e., premiums based on the average costs of the insurance pool, 
see id. § 300gg. 
The ACA’s prohibition on traditional means of pricing the insurance pool 
disrupts the market function of rating insurance premiums based on the 
probabilities of unexpected medical conditions.  The Act makes health insurance 
an entitlement, which insurers must provide irrespective of individual 
characteristics.  By forcing health insurers to cover those with expensive medical 
conditions and to set premiums based on average costs, the ACA would cause 
healthcare premiums for everyone to rise dramatically.  The CBO has estimated 
that the ACA will cause costs for health insurance in the individual market to rise 
27 to 30 percent over current levels in 2016.16   
Congress thus imposed the individual mandate to subsidize health insurers 
and lower the premiums for voluntary consumers by compelling individuals, no 
matter how young and healthy, to pay for health insurance they do not want, at 
premiums that ensure they will pay more than they will receive in benefits.  By 
                                           
16  CBO, Premiums, 6.   
   17
forcing consumers to engage in economically disadvantageous transactions, 
Congress sought to mitigate the regulatory costs imposed on insurers and the sharp 
rise in healthcare premiums caused by the ACA. 
 The CBO estimates that the individual mandate will have the effect of 
reducing premiums for those currently uninsured by choice between $28 and $39 
billion in 2016 alone.17  In other words, the roughly 8 million Americans the CBO 
estimates will be subject to the mandate will be forced to purchase health insurance 
at elevated premiums for the sole purpose of subsidizing the premiums of those 
who voluntarily enter the private health insurance market.  Such a subsidy 
obviously has no correlation to the alleged cost-shifting practices of the voluntarily 
insured and everything to do with making more palatable the rise in healthcare 
premiums that the ACA itself will inevitably impose.   
 Thus, those subject to the mandate have not contributed materially to the 
cost-shifting problem identified by the Government.  Instead, using the individual 
mandate as a subsidy, Congress was compensating for the market effects of its own 
actions.  Whatever one might say about such a course as a policy matter, the 
constitutional implications of permitting such bootstrapping as a valid regulation of 
interstate commerce are sweeping and unprecedented. 
                                           
17  Id.   
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II. THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT RELY ON THE “UNIQUE” 
FEATURES OF THE HEALTHCARE MARKET AS A LIMIT  
ON THE EXERCISE OF FEDERAL POWER HERE. 
 
The Government and the Economist Amici argue that the economics of the 
healthcare industry are “unique” and therefore warrant an unprecedented expansion 
of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.  See U.S. Br. at 7-10; Econ. Br. at 5, 8-
19.  While the healthcare industry, like all markets, may suffer from externalities 
and inefficiencies, market failures alone do not free the federal Government from 
the traditional limitation that it regulate only “activities that arise out of or are 
connected with a commercial transaction.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis 
added).  Yet the Economist Amici suggest that because the healthcare market 
differs so greatly from other markets, this Court need not worry that upholding 
section 1501 would permit widespread federal regulation of inactivity in other 
contexts.  See Econ. Br. at 2, 20-26.  Aside from implicitly acknowledging the 
extraordinary nature of the Government’s argument, these claims of “uniqueness” 
fail on their own terms because they suffer from logical leaps and imprecise 
economics. 
A. The Need for “Health Care” Is Not Uniquely “Unavoidable.” 
The Government and its amici assert that participation in the healthcare 
market is “essentially universal,” U.S. Br. at 7, and “unavoidable,” Econ. Br. 20-22.  
Such statements are gross oversimplifications.  Health care does not refer to a 
   19
single physical good—like an apple or a book—but to a complex array of goods 
and services, the need for and cost of which have changed with medical advances, 
cultural shifts, and technological developments.  A person does not “need” health 
care in the same way a person “needs” to eat.  Indeed, individuals’ use of health 
care can vary dramatically due to their religious beliefs, health profiles, income, 
geography, and many other factors.   
It is generally true that most people receive medical care at some point.  At 
this level of abstraction, however, there are numerous economic markets in which 
participation may be deemed to be universal.  Virtually all Americans will 
participate in the “transportation” market in one way or another, whether they drive 
a car, ride a bus, or take a train.  Likewise, all Americans will participate in the 
“food” market insofar as the consumption of food—in contrast to health care—
actually does constitute a necessary human activity.   
In other words, for the Government to claim that the market for health care 
is “unavoidable,” or even that it is important, is not to say that it is materially 
distinct from many other markets that are valued and common in modern 
American life.  The healthcare market, like these other markets, remains subject to 
the basic laws of supply and demand and consumer choice, and it is these laws that 
will determine the kinds and amounts of goods and services purchased by 
consumers.  Health care involves a wide range of available treatments and costs, 
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and there is hardly an “unavoidable” need for many of the expensive procedures 
and treatments that some individuals may choose, or that some forms of insurance 
may cover.  Likewise, Congress’s labeling of a given procedure or service as 
“essential” does not necessarily make it so as an economic matter.18  Thus, at 
bottom, the assertion that health care is “unavoidable” only raises the question 
what services “health care” should encompass and what portion of that care, if any, 
is truly unavoidable.   
B. The Need for Health Care Is Not Uniquely Unpredictable. 
The Government and its amici also assert that health care is unique in that its 
costs can be unpredictable.  See U.S. Br. at 7; Econ. Br. at 5, 10.  But virtually 
every insurance product is designed to cover the costs of some occurrence that is 
unpredictable and that may involve risks that are unknown or unexpected.  No 
doubt, medical emergencies or other health crises can unexpectedly result in higher 
costs.  That is why many people would choose to purchase health insurance, even 
without the federal subsidization of the healthcare insurance market. 
In fact, however, the routine costs of care for most people are fairly 
predictable.  The average expenditures per year per person are calculated and 
                                           
18  The ACA actually purports to define “essential” health benefits in a way 
that includes a host of routine and predictable medical services, including 
“preventive and wellness services,” “prescription drugs,” and “pediatric services, 
including oral and vision care.”  42 U.S.C. § 18022.  
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published with regularity.19  Moreover, most people can assess their own medical 
expenses and, taking into account past doctor’s visits and medication needs, 
reasonably estimate costs for the coming year.  Millions of people do this every 
year when they elect to use flexible spending accounts as part of a pre-tax benefit.  
Such accounts are generally “use it or lose it” and thus require participants to 
commit to the amount for which they plan to seek reimbursement for medical 
expenses in the coming year.  Thus, when the Government and its amici assert that 
the need for healthcare services is unpredictable, all they can really plausibly mean 
is that the need for catastrophic care is unpredictable.   
Catastrophic loss, however, is hardly unique to the healthcare industry.  A 
family could be more financially devastated by a fire or flood that destroys their 
home, or by an accident that totals the family car, than by unexpected medical 
expenses.  What is different about the healthcare industry, perhaps, is that the ACA 
actually disfavors insurance for catastrophic care and instead mandates coverage 
for “essential” healthcare features that include, in substantial part, routine and 
predictable healthcare costs.  See 42 U.S.C. § 18022.  Thus, the individual mandate 
can hardly be justified by the proposition that health insurance is needed to handle 
catastrophic care, and the claim that the Government should have greater authority 
                                           
19  See, e.g., CMS, National Health Expenditure 2009 Highlights (2011). 
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to regulate the healthcare market because the risk of catastrophic loss is 
unpredictable suffers from the absence of any limiting principle.   
The Government’s argument that the healthcare market is unique because it 
is “unpredictable” carries no water:  Routine care is, in fact, quite predictable, and 
the desire for insurance to address catastrophic occurrences is endemic to every 
market for insurance.   
C. The High Cost of Care Does Not Differentiate the Healthcare 
Industry from Other Markets. 
Relatedly, the high cost of modern health care provides no basis for treating 
the healthcare industry differently from other markets.  The Economist Amici 
contend that health care is unique because “medical care is so expensive [that] 
essentially everyone must have some access to funds beyond their own resources 
in order to afford it.”  Econ. Br. at 11.  Once again, this argument lacks any 
limiting principle.  The basis for a constitutional rule cannot turn on a price index 
or the amount of consumption funded by insurance versus personal funds.  
Moreover, as discussed above, this argument depends on misleading 
statistics that conflate the healthcare costs spent by the insured, including Medicare 
recipients, with the much lower costs of the voluntarily uninsured.  Indeed, 
millions of Americans have demonstrated this fallacy by voting with their wallets 
and electing to pay for their health care out of pocket for some period of time.  
Indeed, this group is the very one the individual mandate seeks to regulate.   
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D. The Healthcare Market Is Not “Unique” Merely Because the 
Government Has Legislated Inefficiencies into the Market. 
In contending that the healthcare market is unique, the Government 
identifies one feature of the market that is a direct result of federal regulation—
consumers receive emergency services irrespective of their ability to pay because 
providers are required to provide certain types of care.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. 
The federal requirement to provide care applies only to emergency-
stabilization care.  Emergency care as a whole (of which federally mandated 
stabilization care is a subset) comprises less than 3 percent of the total healthcare 
market, and only about half of that care goes uncompensated.20  Thus, the 
Government’s argument rests on a relatively small piece of the healthcare industry. 
Even so, this feature of health care is not innate to the market, but is the 
byproduct of the federal regulatory regime.  It is thus circular for the Government 
to claim authority to regulate a unique type of market externality that it has itself 
created.  As the Brief for the Private Plaintiffs-Appellees explains, the Government 
cannot justify the expansion of federal power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause as necessary to cure the adverse impact of federal regulations.  See Private 
Pltfs.’ Br. at 34-37. 
                                           
20  See American College of Emergency Physicians, “Costs of Emergency 
Care,” available at http://www.acep.org/content.aspx?id=25902; CMS, National 
Health Expenditure 2009 Highlights, Table 1 (2011). 
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To take another analogy, it is well established that a law enforcement officer 
may not create an exigency and then use it as an excuse for failure to obtain a 
warrant.  See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); United States v. 
Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1991) (“a warrantless search is illegal when 
police . . . create exigent circumstances”).  Likewise, a prosecutor may not delay a 
prosecution and then seek relief from the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment.  See, e.g., United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971); United 
States v. Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2006).  Nor may the federal 
Government spend years neglecting the disposal of hazardous nuclear waste and 
then coerce the States to take title to the waste.  See New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 188 (1992).  These cases recognize the commonsense proposition that 
the Government may not enlarge its powers in order to fix a mess of its own 
making.   
While there may be good reasons underlying many federal regulations in the 
healthcare industry, the Government may not point to externalities created by those 
regulations as supplying the justification for regulations outside its traditional 
enumerated powers.  The impact of federally required emergency stabilization care 
thus cannot form the basis for expanding the federal power to regulate activity 
beyond Congress’s enumerated powers.   
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E. The True Externalities in the Healthcare Market Ultimately Are 
Local and Fully Subject to the Police Powers of the States.   
The mere fact that the healthcare market suffers from certain externalities 
cannot alone justify the expansion of federal power to regulate a decision not to 
participate in the healthcare market.  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 
(1997) (“the Constitution … divides power among sovereigns … precisely so that 
we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient 
solution to the crisis of the day”).  Even so, the District Court’s conclusion that 
Congress may not compel market participation under the Commerce Clause will 
not leave the States without their traditional powers to regulate healthcare services. 
Indeed, the States have the full power to address such externalities because 
the markets at issue are fundamentally local in nature.  The “national healthcare 
market” that the Government describes is nothing more than an aggregation of 
disparate local healthcare markets.  The majority of healthcare providers service 
consumers of care within a specific geographical area.  Health insurers are subject 
to stringent state regulation limiting, among other things, insurers’ ability to sell 
health insurance across state boundaries.  The business of insurance, of course, has 
traditionally been regulated by the States, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1012, and it will 
continue to be so, even under the ACA.   
As the Economist Amici emphasize, the individual mandate is a policy that 
was first adopted in certain States, such as Massachusetts.  Those States have 
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employed a myriad of approaches to solving challenges arising from the healthcare 
market, including by expanding existing public programs, providing incentives for 
small businesses to offer private insurance, subsidizing premiums, requiring 
employers to offer insurance, and mandating individual insurance, to name a few.  
In these and other policies, the States have formulated various solutions to address 
the general problems associated with rising healthcare costs and the specific 
externalities and distortions affecting local markets.21   
Although many States have made this case in challenging the individual 
mandate, several have filed amicus briefs supporting the Government.  Those State 
Amici support the Government’s position because the ACA’s federal subsidies, 
including the individual mandate, may reduce the States’ own healthcare costs.  
See, e.g., State Amici Br. at 2.  That certain States have a fiscal motivation to 
support the Act is understandable, but the fact remains that the States within our 
constitutional system have both the traditional power and the practical ability to 
enact meaningful healthcare reform.  Accordingly, a decision by this Court to 
                                           
 21  For a comprehensive survey of state healthcare reform legislation, see, 
e.g., John E. McDonough, et al., “A Progress Report On State Health Access 
Reform,” Health Affairs, 27, no.2 (2008), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/27/2/w105.full.html; see also Amy M. 
Lischko and Kristin Manzolillo, “An Interim Report Card on Massachusetts Heath 
Care Reform, Part 1:  Increasing Access,” Pioneer Institute, 12 (2010) (concluding 
“the reform has been successful at insuring more Massachusetts residents”); 
Healthcare for All Kids, available at http://www.allkidscovered.com (guaranteeing 
health insurance to all children in the Illinois). 
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reaffirm the traditional constitutional boundaries on Congress’s power to regulate 
commerce will encourage and promote State-sponsored and administrated 
solutions that reflect the appropriate workings among the laboratories of 
democracy in our federal system.  
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the judgment below. 
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APPENDIX A 
METHODOLOGY OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 The statistics cited by Amici were calculated using the Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey (MEPS) dataset according to the following methodology: 
 Spending by the Young, Healthy, and Uninsured:  The “young, healthy 
and uninsured” population was derived from the following MEPS dataset 
variables for the 2008 Household panel survey using SAS software: 
NOT 
o ASTHDXY2=1   OR   (has asthma) 
o ARTHDXY2=1   OR   (has arthritis) 
o DIABDXY2=1   OR    (has diabetes) 
o CHBRON5 =1   OR    (has bronchitis) 
o EMPHDXY2=1   OR    (has emphysema)  
o CHDDXY2 =1   OR    (has coronary heart disease) 
o BPMLDXY2=1   OR (has high blood press) 
o CANCERY2  NE    (has history of any cancer) 
AND  
o Age between 21 and 35 
AND 
o PRVEVY2 ne 1   (no private health insurance in 2008)   
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o PUBAPY2X ne 1   (no public health insurance in 2008) 
These variables yield a total population of approximately 11,970,000 with 
aggregate health spending of about $10,226,000,000.  The average health 
care costs by this class may be expressed as: 
($10,226,000,000) / (11,970,000) = $854 
The aggregate emergency room spending for this population was 
$676,000,000.  Thus, the average costs of emergency care are: 
($676,000,000) / (11,970,000) = $56 
 Uncompensated Care:  Based on $43 billion per year in total 
uncompensated costs, that sum was apportioned among the various 
populations contributing to uncompensated care.   
First, the following groups receiving uncompensated care were identified 
from the MEPS dataset: 
o Uninsured individuals with previously existing conditions; 
o Individuals or households earning less than 133% of the federal 
poverty line; 
o Illegal aliens or nonresidents of the United States; 
o Insured individuals who did not pay their out of pocket share; 
o The young, healthy, and uninsured. 
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To determine uncompensated care, the MEPS data were employed to 
identify individuals who, at the time of billing by their healthcare provider, 
did not have insurance: 
 
Population Uncompensated Care $ (in millions) Percentage of $43 billion 
Previously existing condition: $15,271 35.5% 
133% of the poverty line: $6,600 15.3% 
Undocumented or non-
residents: 
$7,182 16.7% 
Insured but unpaid: $8,685 20.2% 
Young, healthy, uninsured: $5,263 12.2% 
TOTAL ~$43,000 100% 
 
The raw data establish about $5.3 billion in uncompensated costs for the 
target category.  Population-specific recovery rates then were calculated for 
each sub-population based on market data in Steven Parente, “Health 
Information Technology and Financing’s Next Frontier: The Potential of 
Medical Banking,” Business Economics (Jan. 2009).  The weighted recovery  
 A-4  
rates are as follows, along with the adjusted yield by population:  
 
Population 
Adjusted 
Recovery 
Rate 
Adjusted 
Uncompensated 
Care $ (in millions) 
Percentage of 
$43 billion 
Previously existing condition: 0.4 $8,656 20.1% 
133% of the poverty line: 0.1 $14,965 34.8% 
Undocumented or non-residents: 0.2 $8,142 18.9% 
Insured but unpaid: 0.6 $3,282 7.6% 
Young, healthy, uninsured: 0.15 $7,956 18.5% 
TOTAL  ~$43,000 100% 
 
The approximately $8 billion in adjusted uncompensated costs from the 
young, healthy, and uninsured can be expressed as a percentage of the 
overall healthcare market of $2.4 trillion as: 
 ($8,000,000,000) (100) / ($2,400,000,000,000) = 0.33% 
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